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“A fresh look at the European-US Cooperation”

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I.)

Three issues can be identified as being at the roots for a profound change in the perception of the European-US relations. These are, in reversed chronological order, (1) *The Iraq war*, (2) *The 9/11 Trauma*, (3) *The end of the cold war*

(1) The Iraq war

It is being argued, that the war in Iraq (March 22nd – May 1st, 2003) has changed the established international order in ways that are only beginning to be understood. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that the relations between Europe and the United States will never be the same again.

No other issue has preoccupied in such a short time the public opinion in the developed countries as the apparent rift in the traditionally close EU-US relations. Conferences on this issue are mushrooming, best-selling books have been written, the ‘think tanks’ in many countries, political scientists in universities around the world, the media have produced hundreds, if not thousands of analyses trying to investigate the causes of the almost suddenly surfacing ‘US Hegemony’ or US proclaimed ‘New World Order’.

Is there now “too much America” and “too little Europe”? And if so, why? ¹ Has the United States now entered the era of an “*Imperial Republic*” as predicted already thirty years ago by *Raymond Aron*? ² Or, as some claim, will the United States be transformed into an “Imperial Presidency” imposing a sort of “Pax Americana” upon the rest of the world? One could indeed interpret some of the pronouncements of US President Bush to this effect. For example, one year after 9/11, in his introduction to the new National Security Strategy of the United States he has declared: “...*The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.*”³

¹ Kagan, Robert, Power and Weakness, in Policy Review, Nr. 113, June/July 2002,

Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New York 2003,

² Aron, Raymond, République impériale – Les Etats-Unis dans le monde (1945-1972), Paris 1973

Aron, Raymond, Mémoires – 50 ans de réflexion politique, Paris 1983, pp. 634-645

cf. also Hassner, Pierre and Vaisse, Justin (Editors), Washington et le monde, dilemmes d’une superpuissance, A Bibliography, Paris 2003

³ Bush, George W., Introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., September 17, 2002, p. II

Time Magazine revealed this motivation in the following terms: *“In truth, this war is just as much about an idea – that Iraq is but the first step in an American-led effort to make the world a safer place.”*⁴

None of the European leaders would have made such a far-reaching statement. But, as *Henry Kissinger* has observed, already almost ten years ago: *“America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world.”*⁵

One of the reasons for the recent rift between the US and some European countries stems, no doubt, from the fact that the vocabulary used by some of the leading American politicians sounds too patriotic for European ears, too missionary oriented and perhaps too much driven by stern American Protestant Evangelism *“On July 4th, 2003, we still placed our trust in Divine Providence”* (George W. Bush).⁶

Analysts are asking themselves now the question, if the present transatlantic encounter has been suddenly brought to the open a catalytic process only set in motion by the Iraq crisis? Is the transatlantic clash of positions just the visible part of an alienation between Europe and the U.S. which has started much earlier?

Robert Cooper, Director-General for External Relations and Political-Military Relations, Council of Ministers of the EU, is supporting this opinion: *“I am today much more concerned about the transatlantic relations than about Europe. Since this relationship defines itself in essence via the security issues, a conflict as occurred during the Iraq crisis can create great damage. However, we must remember that the process of drifting apart has not just begun under the Bush Administration. It is, if you so wish, a secular trend.”*⁷ A similar position is being taken by *Robert Kagan*: *“Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George Bush sr.”*⁸

It should be said from the outset, that the issue at stake is not “EU” versus “US” and even lesser so “Europe” versus “US”:

According to a listing published by the White House, six of the EU-15 member countries, i.e. Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as the EU associated member Turkey, have publicly committed themselves to the US-led ‘Coalition of the willing’. From the ten Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries, all of them (with the exception of Slovenia) have been listed by the White House as coalition members. Additional European countries on this list are Iceland, and Ukraine.^{9 10}

The U.S. Secretary of Defence, *Donald Rumsfeld*, has redefined history in his own way in clustering those 18 countries of Europe which supported the U.S. position into “New Europe” and those 9 EU countries which opposed the U.S. stance, into “Old Europe”.

The handling of the Iraq crisis has thus deeply divided the European countries, the EU-15 as much as the EU candidate countries and has not spared ‘special triangular relationships’ such as the three countries of the “Weimar Triangle”, i.e. France, Germany and Poland, as well as the three neighbouring countries of the NAFTA (U.S., Canada and Mexico) and the much older the “Transatlantic Triangle”, that is to say U.S., U.K. and Canada.

⁴ Elliot, Michael/Carney, James, First Stop: Iraq, in: Time Magazine, March 31, 2003

⁵ Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York 1994, p. 18

⁶ The White House, President Bush Honors Military in Fourth of July Speech, Dayton, Ohio, July 4, 2003, p.3

⁷ Cooper, Robert, „Auf Deutschland kommt eine enorme Aufgabe zu“, Interview in ‚Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung‘, 27. May 2003, p. 7

⁸ Kagan, Robert, Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review, Nr. 113, June/July 2002, p 5

⁹ The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq: Special Report, April 2003

¹⁰ All in all, the Defence Department reports that by December 2003 63 countries belong to the “coalition of the willing”

In consequence, there is no evidence for the simplistic argument that the Europe as a whole or – for that matter – the EU in its entirety, EU-15 or the future EU-25 – has alienated itself from the US. Some individual countries have done so, others have not.

The shock waves from the attack on 9/11 resulting in the described profound change of US attitudes on aggression continue to be felt today. Here lie also the roots for the basic change of attitude and disenchantment of the US towards some of its European partners. *Donald Rumsfeld*, in a presentation to a Congressional Committee outlined e.g. “*that some countries were not helping the US – like Cuba, Libya, and Germany.*”¹¹ In a speech to US Congress on 20.9.2001 President Bush has declared that each country has to choose, either to be on the side of America or on the side of the terrorists.¹²

Before looking to the causes for the present rift in the transatlantic relations, it seems to be useful to recall earlier happier times in the American-European partnership since WWII. To quote only one of the US Presidents during that period:

John F. Kennedy, on July 4, 1962 in Independence Hall, has said that “alone” the United States could not do any of the big things which should be done in the world, but that “joined with other free nations” it could.¹³ On another occasion he said “*we (Americans) do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner*”. He even proposed that a “*Declaration of Interdependence*” be made between what he described “*As the new union emerging in Europe and the old American Union*”.¹⁴

Thirty years later, *Brent Scowcroft*, National Security Advisor to President George Bush coined the slogan “*Together where we can, alone where we must*” which seems to have been reversed, another ten years later, by the present US administration into “*Alone where we can, together if we must.*”

For *Donald Rumsfeld*, U.S. Secretary of Defence, in the future “*the mission will determine the coalition*”. If this concept were to be followed, it could indeed mean the end of the intergovernmental system as exemplified by the UN or by NATO and as known up-till now. What is probably meant by this statement, can be read in the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, adopted in September 2002: “*The alliance (NATO) must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission based-coalitions.*”¹⁵

(2) The 9/11 2001 trauma

The second and most profound incident resulting in the profound change of both public opinion and of the US leadership towards the UN and multilateral cooperation with the allies in NATO and EU was the traumatic experience of “9/11”. *George W. Bush* has paraphrased the sustained impact on the U.S. policy of this tragic event as follows: “*For America, our resolve to fight terror was firmly set on a single day of violence and sorrow. The attacks of September 11th, 2001, changed my country. On that morning, the American people saw the hatred of our enemies and the future grief they intend for us. The American government*

¹¹ Cit. in Elizabeth Pond, *The Greek Tragedy of NATO*, in: *Transatlantic Internationale Politik*, 1/2003, p.9

¹² US Embassy Berlin, USINFO-B-DE, 21.9.2001

¹³ Uri, Pierre et al., *Partnership for Progress – A Program for Transatlantic Action*, New York 1963, p.X

¹⁴ cit. in Javier Solana, *Mars and Venus reconciled: A new era for transatlantic relations*, Albert H. Gordon lecture, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 7. April 2002, p.1

¹⁵ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., September 2002, p. 25

accepted a mission to strike and defeat the terror network and to hold accountable all who harbor it and who support it."¹⁶

More recently, *Condoleeza Rice* has echoed these feelings as follows: *"No less than Pearl Harbor, September 11 forever changed the lives of every American and the strategic perspective of the United States. September 11 produced an acute sense of our vulnerability to attacks that come with no warning. In the terrifying hours and days that followed the attacks, we resolved that only true defence against a threat of this kind is to root it out at its source and to address it at its fundamental and ideological core."*¹⁷

Many Europeans have apparently even today not well understood to which extent 9/11 has marked a turning point in U.S. attitudes judging in its international relations friends and foes likewise.

It would be a grave error to believe that the 9/11 trauma would be felt in essence by the US political and military leadership and not by the American constituencies at large and by the American people. For example, *Herbert I. Fushfeld*, former President of the Industrial Research Institute Inc. (IRI), to which some 250 of the leading US corporations belong, has expressed his feelings as follows:

*"Since 9/11, we have been at war. Someone has declared war on us, and it is not another nation, so the rules that have evolved about relations between nations do not apply. We feel threatened with violence in a way that most Europeans do not."*¹⁸

In his remarks to a large military gathering at the 4th July celebration 2003 in Dayton, Ohio, the US President declared *"Our nation is still at war... The United States will not stand by and wait for another attack, or trust in the restraint and good intentions of evil men.... We will act whenever it is necessary to protect the lives and the liberty of the American people."*¹⁹

Apparently not all in Europe possess the sensitivity to understand what it meant for the only superpower of the world, which was sure about its invulnerability, that an attack of this order of magnitude of 9/11 was possible.

The US, unlike Europe, has responded with a complete reorientation of its defence policy (*'revolution in military affairs'*):

- adoption of a comprehensive new "National Security Strategy",²⁰
- built-up of a new gigantic 'Department of Homeland Security',
- creation of a new Regional Command for the Defence of the North American Continent (NORTHCOM),
- arrangements for the installation of a comprehensive Missile Defence System in Alaska and – most visible and regardless of public opinion in the world - a profound change of military strategy in making preventive wars an instrument of national self-defence: *"assuring, dissuading, deterring, defeating"*.^{21 22}
- Increase of the budget for military expenditures since 2001 from 300 Bill.US-\$ to 400 Bill.US-\$ (Budget plan 2004). This amount is in the same order of magnitude of all Direct Foreign Investments (FDI) in the world. It is intended to further increase the

¹⁶ The White House, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Krakow, May 31, 2003, p.2

¹⁷ The White House, Remarks by Condoleeza Rice, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 26.6.03

¹⁸ Fushfeld, Herbert I., Personal e-mail message to the author, May, 30, 2003

¹⁹ The White House, President Bush Honors Military in Fourth of July Speech, Dayton, Ohio, July 4, 2003, p.2/3

²⁰ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

The complete text of the new National Security Strategy of the US, presented on 17.9.2002 by President George W. Bush can be found at: <http://www.usembassy.de/policy/nss.pdf>

²¹ Schwarz, Klaus-Dieter, Militärstrategie und Streitkräfte, in: SWP-Berlin, Zwei Jahre Präsident Bush, Berlin, März 2003, p.12

²² <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

US defence budget - unprecedented in the history of nations - by the year 2007 up to more than 450 Bill.US-\$. This equals to two and a half times of the military budget of the EU-15 countries.²³

Jack Straw, the British Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, has described this situation as follows: “*Since 11 September, all EU Member States recognise that the world has entered a dangerous new era. And we would all agree that the threats to our security – from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and chaos and contagion from falling states – may in extremis require a military response.*”²⁴

The debate in Europe, whether or not the war in Iraq was ‘illegal’, since carried out without the formal backing of the UN Security Council, seems to be irrelevant for the US. The country regards *Islamic Fundamentalism, Terrorism, Mass Destruction Weapons*²⁵ as the greatest threat to its security. The UN Charter, devised almost 60 years ago, did not foresee such ‘modern’ threats. A debate on how to adjust the legal basis of the UN to the demands of the 21st Century, has just begun.

Indeed, whether these threats seen by the US are real or not is beside the point. The sheer fact that the most powerful country in the world feels threatened must be taken seriously.

Taking sides, in one way or the other, will inevitably either forge new alliances with the US or will break others – regardless whether they have been in existence for many years or not.

An illustration of a typical American opinion when judging European attitudes of indifference on this vital issue for the US, was given by *Jack Straw* as follows: “*An American liberal Democrat, Michael Walzer, typifies the US consensus. He recently wrote, ‘when war is just and necessary, as in the Gulf in 1991 or in Kosovo in 1999, it is the United States that bears the brunt of the fighting. Our European allies oppose American unilateralism only this far: they want a role in deciding when war is just and necessary, but they are content, once the decision is made, to leave most of the fighting to American soldiers.*”²⁶

(3.) New situation after the end of the ‘Cold War’

The third development which has changed profoundly the U.S. attitude towards the UN – and any other form of multilateral cooperation - was the breaking up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Since the world system was in essence after WWII – expressed in simplistic terms - a bipolar system, divided into influence zones of the “West” and of the “East”, a pattern into which even the so-called Third World had to choose sides, the break-down of the ‘socialist camp’ in 1989-1991 has brought about a fundamentally new situation. The issue is now not anymore geared towards bipolar relations, but the question is whether the only surviving superpower, the United States of America, is seeing its role essentially in a unipolar world – under US leadership, or to what extent would the US be ready to accept a grand multipolar design in which various centres of gravity in the world, various “poles” do cooperate. In other words, how does the US define its hegemonic leadership in the world?

Not only since 9/11 in 2001, has the U.S. position already differed from the European assessment. The role of the what the US has labelled “*rogue states*” or “*States Threatening International Peace and Security (STIPS)*” grouping such different countries as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea and Cuba, is one illustration. Furthermore, and as the debate on the

²³ The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, has indicated that the enlarged EU of 25 members is spending a total of 160 billion € on defence.

²⁴ Straw, Jack, Europe in the World, Speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19.5.2003

²⁵ Weisser, Ulrich, Der Irak: Eine Aufgabe für die Nato, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.4.2003

²⁶ Straw, Jack, Europe in the World, Speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19.5.2003

war in Iraq has demonstrated, the U.S. – together with countries such as the U.K. – has seen a greater threat of arms of mass destruction in the hands of the so-called ‘states of concern’ than a number of its European allies. Even before the present Bush Administration took power, the former U.S. Secretary of State *Madeleine Albright* had identified the non-proliferation of mass destruction arms as the key issue of contemporary security interest and as the overall uniting threat of the Western alliance.²⁷

II.)

(A) Multilateral security concepts by the United Nations, by NATO and by the EU

The Security Advisor to the US President, *Condoleezza Rice* has given a very revealing picture on multipolarity or multilateralism on one side and unipolarity or unilateralism on the other. She has said: “...*Some argue that Europe and America are more divided by differing worldviews than we are united by common values.*

More troubling, some have spoken admiringly – almost nostalgically – of “multipolarity” as a good thing, to be desired for its own sake.

The reality is that “multi-polarity” was never a unifying idea, or a vision. It was a necessary evil that sustained the absence of war but did not promote the triumph of peace. Multipolarity is a theory of rivalry; of competing interest – and at its worst – of competing values.” She concluded her line of thought in arguing that the vision in Europe since the defeat of communism was “*to rid Europe of ‘poles’ and to unite Europeans around shared goals and common values.*”²⁸ The message is clear: The close cooperation between the US and Europe will continue, based on re-affirmed common principles but not necessarily on shared leadership.

In clear contrast to this, the European Security concept, however, presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003, is highlighting the need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism.²⁹

(a.) United Nations

What has been the role of the United Nations in the Iraq crisis? It would not serve any purpose reiterating here in detail the 17 resolutions of UN Security Council dealing with that subject.

Condoleezza Rice, expressed herself in mid-April 2003 in rather strong terms: According to her, in the field of security, the UN has up-till now produced nothing but a series of failures.³⁰ But not only Americans are sceptical. *S. Neil Mac Farlane*, Oxford University and Faculty member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in his analysis „*Rebuilding Iraq: The UN is not up to the job*” came to similar conclusions: “ „*The UN is a loose confederation of agencies over which the secretary-general wields little real power....*” *There is a number of chronic problems with this system: weak lines of authority; squabbling between departments within the Secretariat; turf battles in the field between UN agencies; deep tensions between civilian and military components of post-conflict administration; and the variable quality and commitment of UN personnel.*” *How likely is it – given the disputes in the Council before and*

²⁷ Drozdiak, William, Albright urges NATO to Fight Arms of Mass Destruction, in: International Herald Tribune, December 17, 1997, p.1

²⁸ The White House, Remarks by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 26.6.2003, p. 2

²⁹ Solana., Javier, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20/06/2003, p.6

³⁰ Le Monde, L’ONU ne veut pas renoncer à sa mission, même si Washington considère qu’elle « n’a connu que des échecs », 16.4.2003, p. 2

*during the war – that the Council will be able to act cohesively, quickly and decisively after the war? If this question cannot be clearly and positively be answered, it would be irresponsible to confer a leading role upon the United Nations.”*³¹

The UN Security Council in its resolution adopted on 22 May 2003 has answered this question clearly: The United Nations will not play a “*leading role*” in the reconstruction of Iraq but instead the Council has resolved that the United Nations should play a “*vital role*” in this process. Furthermore, the Council has specifically recognised “*the authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the “Authority”)*”.³²

On the surface, the role of the international system as such seems not to be seriously questioned by the US. In the contrary.

President Bush, in his introduction to the new National Security Strategy has reaffirmed the commitment of the US to the world system:

*“We are ... guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, The Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.”*³³

The way that the Iraq crisis was handled – by the UN and by the U.S. – is delivering perhaps a blueprint for the development of new power rules leading to a new concept of “World Order”. *Condoleeza Rice*, in June 2003, is not ruling out from the U.S. point of view the involvement of the multilateral system in tackling global security issues – provided profound adjustments in these agencies are taking place. Therefore, she is calling for a ‘new spirit’ preparing NATO to take on critical missions out of area. She is calling for a new spirit “*to embolden the great multilateral institutions – particularly the United Nations – to defeat the common enemies of civilization: terror, poverty and oppression.*”³⁴

The U.S. has always used the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal to make its voice heard in international organisations and to make it by way of ‘*stick and carrot*’ strategies crystal-clear about the possible consequences if resolutions or programmes voted by majorities against American interests would be implemented. And yet, unlike other countries, the U.S. has rarely used the “*empty chair*” policy for the boycott of international activities. If the U.S. position on the creation of the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC) is a blueprint for similar future actions on other fields remains to be seen.³⁵ The creation of the ICC, originally supported by the Clinton Administration, was later categorically rebuked by the Bush Administration. In his statement on the renewal of UN Resolution 1422 in the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador *James Cunningham* went as far as saying “*The ICC is not a UN institution and, some would even say, challenges and weakens the UN Charter system and the Council’s place in it. ... The United States, therefore, has a fundamental objection to*

³¹ MacFarlane, S. Neil, *Rebuilding Iraq: The UN is not up to the job*”, in: International Herald Tribune, 14.4.2003, p. 10

³² United Nations Security Council, S/Res/1483 (2003) adopted on 22 May 2003

³³ Bush, George W., *Introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C., September 17, 2002, p.III

³⁴ The White House, *Remarks by Dr. Condoleeza Rice at the Institute for Strategic Studies*, London, June 26, 2003, p.3

³⁵ *Amerika droht Partnern mit Streichen der Militärhilfe. Streit über Internationalen Gerichtshof*, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2.7.2003

the ICC. In our view, it is a fatally flawed institution...”.³⁶ The same “stop and go” – or rather “go and stop” attitude was applied by the Bush jr. Administration versus the Clinton Administration on the positions taken towards the ratification of the “Kyoto Protocol”.

(b.) NATO

NATO has permanently adjusted itself to the changing situation after the end of the Cold War and has made all multitude of efforts to create flexible cooperation schemes:

In an unprecedented act of solidarity and as an immediate response to an American request, NATO for the first time ever, invoked Article 5 of its Treaty and declared the attacks occurred on 9/11 in New York and in Washington as an armed attack on all members of the alliance.

And yet, in 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, *Paul Wolfowitz*, when referring to the alliance, proclaimed the “*irrelevance of NATO*”.

Since not all of 26 sovereign member states of an enlarged NATO³⁷ (or, for that matter, the 15 member of the UN Security Council) will necessarily always accept the US set priorities as their own, the US will – as in the case of the Iraq war – lean increasingly towards *ad-hoc* “Alliances of the willing”.

The NATO Secretary-General, *George Robertson*, admits openly that indeed – regardless of 9/11 or the Iraq crisis – NATO in the previous format is defunct: “...*The theme I have been asked to tackle is whether after Iraq, the security strategies of the US and Europe are still compatible. My answer is, yes they are.*

That does not mean that the old cold war partnership between Europe and North America is still alive and kicking. It is not. It is dead and has been for some time.

However, it is being replaced by something very different yet, I believe equally robust. A partnership for the 21st century based on security strategies which are at least as compatible as those which saw us through the cold war.”³⁸

The necessity for Europe to mobilise greater military efforts on her own, either within NATO or within the EU, has not found the necessary support leading from intention to action. Most European defence budgets continue to stagnate or even to fall.

To make things even more complicated, the former U.S. Secretary of Defence, *William Cohen*, has declared at the Security Conference 2002 in Munich that the U.S. would not be in favour of an autonomous Defence Policy of the EU outside the NATO structure.³⁹ And yet, the intended European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO has not made much progress either.

In spite of this dilemma, the European Council has reaffirmed on 20 March 2003 in a statement on Iraq “...*We are determined to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in the context of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).* On the other hand, initiatives to accelerate the European Security and Defence Policy at a meeting on 29. April 2003 in Brussels by

Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg have provoked mixed feelings by other EU-15 members and by future EU members. At the Wroclaw Summit of the Weimar Triangle on 9. May 2003, the Polish President *Aleksander Kwasniewski* made it very clear, that he was

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, Statement by James Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations on the Renewal of Resolution 1422 in the Security Council, New York, June 12, 2003

³⁷ The second Eastern enlargement of NATO will take effect as from May 2004 and will increase the membership to 26 countries

³⁸ Lord Robinson, The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still compatible?“, Speech by the NATO Secretary-General in Berlin, 24. June 2003, see also: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Robertson für Nato-Einsatz im Irak, 25.6.2003, p.1

³⁹ Bierling, Stefan, Die Europäische Union und die USA, in: Werner Weidenfeld (Editor), Europa-Handbuch, Gütersloh 2002, p. 642

unwilling to accept any defence structure which might ultimately weaken NATO or which might lead to some duplication of efforts with NATO.⁴⁰

It appears at present that NATO continues, as in the times of the Cold War, to be only effective if the interests of the alliance are fully in line with the interests of the US.⁴¹

(c.) Security Cooperation with the European Union

Both the US and the EU have realised that after the end of the ‘cold war’ that what is known as “*enabling partnership*” needed not necessarily a new foundation but rather a new orientation. To this effect, in regular intervals during the 1990’s and with a new momentum after 9/11, a number of initiatives have been launched.

It can be predicted already now that in December 2003, when in Rome the Intergovernmental Conference of the EU will have to ratify the intended European constitution, a new coalition consisting of the two European incumbents of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council will insist that the national ‘veto’ will remain at the heart of European foreign policy making. The switch hoped for by others favouring majority voting would thus be prevented.⁴² On the same issue, the British Foreign Minister, *Jack Straw*, was outspoken even before the EU Convent had reached an agreement of the draft of the European Constitution: “*We also have responsibilities as one of the Union’s two Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and the United Nations is and will remain an association of sovereign nation states.*” In the same statement the British Minister made it bluntly clear what he feels about the outcome of the Convent. He said on 19th May 2003: “*There’s a really important... point. The Convention is making final decisions on nothing....*

Instead it will depend solely on the governments of the 25 nation states, meeting together in an Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) and able to take decisions only by unanimity.”⁴³ Mr. Straw went on to say “*The Iraq crisis has shown that the foreign policies of nation states are ultimately determined by national interests. That will always be the case in a Union whether of 15 or 25 sovereign countries...* ”.⁴⁴

Against this background, there seems to be little room for optimism within the foreseeable future for the adoption of mechanisms allowing for a European “Common Foreign and Security Policy” if such a policy were to be meant more than just the umbrella for the least common denominator.

III.

Conclusions and final observations

(A)

When looking at the quality of the new transatlantic relations, less than two years after 9/11 and less than two months after the end of the war in Iraq, the following conclusions can be offered:

⁴⁰ Standke, Klaus-Heinrich, Zwischen Irak-Krise und ESVP: Was wird aus dem Weimarer Dreieck?, in: Dokumente – Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, Nr. 3/2003, June 2003

⁴¹ Arnold, Hans, Sicherheit für Europa durch Kooperation, Development and Peace Foundation, Policy Paper Nr. 18, Bonn, June 2001, p.8

⁴² Parker, George, France and Britain win EU veto victory, in : Financial Times, 26. 5. 2003

⁴³ The British Minister’s prediction was fully confirmed by the outcome of the ill-fated EU Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels on 12/13 December 2003

⁴⁴ Straw, Jack, Europe in the World, Speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19.5.2003

(1) The rules governing the international system seem to be ‘deregulated’. The United States have emerged from the end of the ‘Cold War’ as the only country “*with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values.*”⁴⁵

(2) The United States whilst using actively its membership in the more than 200 intergovernmental global and regional organisations, but experience shows, it will not yield to majority rules (including those of the UN Security Council) as long as they are not in line with US interests. *Andrew B. Denison* has appropriately labelled this peculiar mix of cooperation on a multilateral scale with unilateral interests “*Multilaterism ‘American style’*”.⁴⁶

(3) President *George W. Bush* has declared on numerous occasions that he will operate – in particular on issues concerning the US security – with ‘coalitions of the willing’ consisting of changing compositions according to the given situation.

(4) The Bush Administration will continue to define US Foreign Policy almost exclusively under the angle of national interests. This is a tendency which can be observed as swinging backwards and forwards for many years in the alternation of US governments coming from the Democratic or the Republican Party.⁴⁷

(5) In the light of the tragic events of 9/11, the US was instrumental to have the notion of terrorism and of other new threats such as Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Failed States’ and organised crime, in a new security environment prominently introduced into the agendas of the UN, NATO, the EU and other intergovernmental agencies as well as into bilateral agreements.

(6) There is a new awareness, that within a rule-based international order, laws must evolve in response to developments such as security threats through proliferation and terrorism as well as through environmental threats such as global warming. The UN Charter, seen under this angle, needs to be accordingly adjusted.

(7) The notion of “pre-emptive engagement” vis-à-vis countries persistently violating international norms of domestic governance or of international behaviour used by the US when justifying the Iraqi war, has found its place in the new concept for a European Security Policy.⁴⁸

(8) The New World Order, which begins to emerge, will have, increasingly an influence on the sensitive interaction between National Security and the access to Global resources. The Iraq oil supplies have perhaps not been at the centre of the causes leading to the recent war, but as in the Gulf war of 1991, when the Kuwait oil supplies were threatened, the future assured free access to the Iraq oil reserves was without any doubt a major strategic consideration behind the motivation to enter into the conflict.

(B)

What is new after 9/11, is the configuration in which international cooperation at large operates. It appears that perhaps with the exception of some of the more technical intergovernmental agencies the entire international system could benefit from a screening process aiming to re-adjust to the prevailing new circumstances on the global scene. The same has to be said about intergovernmental organisations operating interregional, such as NATO or OECD. The only ‘supranational organisation, i.e. the EU has just undergone the difficult exercise to define its constitution permitting, among other objectives, a more effective functioning of the organisation. All of them, regardless of their mandate or their size, have not

⁴⁵ Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, op.cit., p. 17

⁴⁶ Denison, Andrew B., Unilateral oder multilateral? Motive der amerikanischen Irakpolitik, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Beilage zur Wochenzeitschrift *Das Parlament*, B 24-25/2003, June 10, 2003, p.17

⁴⁷ Rice, Condolezza, Promoting the National Interest, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, 2000, No. 1, p.46

⁴⁸ Solana, Javier, A Secure Europe in a better world, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20/06/2003, p. 10

yet overcome the organisational difficulties caused in essence by the fast growth in membership after the dismantling of the former Soviet Union.

- The UN system was geared for more than four decades in an essentially bipolar ‘East-West’ orientation. Even strong UN supporters are admitting that confronted with the new global threats, the international system did not evolve sufficiently in order to redefine its role as custodian of the “*Gewaltmonopol*” in the world. Closely connected with this issue is the question of “sovereignty” of nations. Should it be lowered and thus permitting other states feeling threatened to enter into pre-emptive wars? Has article 2,4 of the UN Charter to be re-interpreted, prohibiting the intervention of the UN “*to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...*”?
- NATO has after the end of the cold war not yet found a new ‘*raison d’être*’. The North-Atlantic Alliance needs a complete overhaul to adjust itself to the new situation. “*Out of area*” missions seem to become the new motivation and replacing the basic NATO concept of collective self-defence. (Lawrence Whitehead: *NATO will be ‘out of area’ or ‘out of business’*). NATO seems to be ready to take on such new roles and missions in new parts of the world and is – in the words of its Secretary-General, “bouncing back”.
- OECD, after a series of enlargements in its membership, finds it increasingly difficult to operate efficiently. In addition to the present 30 member states, there are at least 10 possible candidate countries hoping for membership.
- The EU - torn between the adoption of a “Constitution” and the process of enlargement - will need time to find a new equilibrium. Critics are predicting that the politically desirable increase in the EU membership to 25 in 2004, 27 by 2007 and bypassing the number of 30 by probably 2010, will be on account of the efficiency of the Union. “*Europe à la carte*” (comparable to the U.S. led ‘coalition of the willing’ with changing compositions) may be an inevitable consequence.
- Last, but not least, Europeans were unable to understand the depth of emotion generated by 9/11 (“*9/11 is everywhere*”) which ultimately has led to a complete ‘turn-around’ of US attitudes towards international cooperation in general including the transatlantic relations. It is today immaterial if - as result of a slowly changing awareness in European countries or because of US pressure - Europe seems to be now almost fully in line with the basic US concerns on international terrorism, organised crime, WMD proliferation and other threats. A Eurobarometer opinion poll, investigating what European citizens do fear, came to similar results as opinion polls on the importance of these issues seen by the US citizens.⁴⁹

(C)

Looking at the present tensions between Europe and the US, it appears that some overreactions may have blurred the true picture.

It is worth to recall the assessment of the European-American relationship made just ten years ago by the acknowledged dean and proponent of the US foreign policy, George F. Kennan, who in his “Personal and Political Philosophy” had this to say:

*“It is true that this country becomes, with every day that passes, less European in the composition of its population and in the relative importance of Europe among its various interests and concerns. Nevertheless, its governmental tradition and its political culture generally have been largely derived from that side of the ocean, particularly, but not exclusively, from the British isles...For these reasons the European continent is, for us, more than just another continent among continents...”*⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Eurobarometre, Sondage no. 58.1, October/Novembre 2002

⁵⁰ Kennan, George F., *Around the cragged Hill – A personal and political philosophy*, New York-London 1993,

In spite of all the turmoil in the transatlantic relations, which we are witnessing today, this statement remains basically as valid as at the time it was written.

President *George Bush jr.*, two years ago, reached a similar assessment when addressing a European audience: “*We share more than an alliance, we share a civilisation. Its values are universal, and they pervade our history and partnership in a unique way.*”⁵¹ He reaffirmed this notion in his remarks “*to the people of Poland*” at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow on May 31th, 2003 in even more dramatic terms: “*Europe and America will always be joined by more than our interests. Ours is a union of ideals and convictions, we believe in human rights, and justice under law, and self-government, and economic freedom tempered by compassion.*

We do not own these beliefs, but we have carried them though the centuries. We will advance them further and we will defend them together.”⁵²

The new EU security concept reaffirms likewise the importance of the EU-US-cooperation: “*...the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. If we build up capabilities and increase coherence, we will be a more credible actor and a more influential partner.*”⁵³

The cautious language chosen, “can”, “if” and “will”, reveals that the present situation offers plentiful room for improvement. *Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsäcker* is calling in this context *for an outline of a proud European vision from which an extent of world-wide influence could follow, which the US simply cannot ignore...*”⁵⁴

Another important ‘bond’ between the two continents should not be overlooked: The transatlantic economic relations have so far not been seriously affected by the recent tensions. The economies – Exchange of Goods and Services as well as Foreign Direct Investments - of the EU countries and of the US are interwoven to such an extent that political disarrays seem to have little effect. The EU and US are not only the largest players in global trade, they are each others largest trade and investment partners. Either the EU and the US is also the largest trade and investment partner for almost all other countries.

To conclude, the Iraqi crisis has had a rather healthy effect on the transatlantic relations. The air has been cleared. In an act of *Realpolitik* the United States has reaffirmed their determination to play the role of the uncontested hegemonic leader. The European countries have apparently neither the will nor the power to challenge this situation. The debates in the UN Security Council concerning the post-Iraq war situation (Res. 1483) or concerning the renewal of resolution 1422 (ICC) have demonstrated that the fierce opposition to the US has been replaced by a pragmatic acceptance of the ‘*fait accompli*’ and by the tacit will to find common solutions for future cooperation: Having assembled 49 countries publicly committed to the “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, the US/UK lead military occupation authority – to which Poland has been co-opted – has had no difficulty after the war to mobilise military support from more than ten countries in the Iraq reconstructing efforts. Others, like Japan, Pakistan and India are likely to join this new “*coalition of the willing.*”

The Secretary-General of NATO, *George Robertson*, in a speech on June 24th in Berlin giving an impressive overview of the results achieved on the whole range of security related questions within NATO, EU and UN said, if he would have made such a statement only a

p.205

⁵¹ cit. by Condoleeza Rice, Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, June 26, 2003, p. 2

⁵² The White House, Remarks by the President to the people of Poland, Krakow, May 31st, 2003, p. 4

⁵³ Solana, Javier, A Secure Europe in a better World, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20/06/2003, p. 15

⁵⁴ Weizsäcker, Ernst-Ulrich von, The Old and New Europe: Alternatives for Future Transatlantic Relations?, Keynote Address to the Transatlantic Policy Consortium, Speyer, 16-18. June 2003, p. 6

year ago, he would have been laughed at and he would have received a storm of protests, perhaps his sanity would have been questioned.⁵⁵

On both sides of the Atlantic, governments – including those that were opposed to the Iraq war – are seemingly inclined to make gestures of reconciliation. No doubt, in this test of strength, the winner is the United States. Even when the US are sending out strong signals for a renewal of the transatlantic partnership, ‘the rules of the game’ will never become the same as before 9/11: *“The future of transatlantic relations will ultimately be decided far more in Washington, by the sole superpower, than in Brussels.”*⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Lord Robertson, *The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still Compatible?*, Berlin, June 24th, 2003, NATO Speeches, p. 3

⁵⁶ *Financial Times*, 30 May 2003, quoted by Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsäcker, *The Old and New Europe: Alternatives for Future Transatlantic Relations*, op.cit., p.4

Biographical Statement: KLAUS-HEINRICH STANDKE

Klaus-Heinrich Standke (Dr.rer.pol., Technological University Berlin; Dr.h.c. Poznan University of Economics; Dr.h.c. International University Moscow) has left high-school with the age of 16 to become an apprentice in a steel mill. Until his baccalaureate at age 25 he has worked in the export departments of Steel manufacturing companies in Wetzlar (Germany), London and Paris.

He has studied Economics and International Relations at the Technical University Berlin and French Literature at the Université de Paris à la Sorbonne.

K.-H. Standke has spent most of his professional life in international organisations: Between 1966 and 1990 he was subsequently Counsellor at the Directorate for Scientific Affairs of the OECD in Paris, and on secondment from this organisation, Secretary-General of the OECD-sponsored European Industrial Research Management Association (EIRMA), Paris to which more than 170 research-intensive industrial corporations from 16 European countries belong; when Germany had joined the United Nations, he was appointed in 1974 as the first Director of his country at the United Nations secretariat in New York; his last function was Assistant Director-General at UNESCO in Paris and until 2000 Special Advisor to the Director-General of this organisation.

After the collapse of the Berlin wall, he returned in 1990 to his native country, Germany, to become the first President of the Academy for East-West Economic Co-operation (OWWA), Berlin.

His advisory activities include the Senate of Berlin, the Council of Europe, the EU, the OECD, OPEC *et al.* Most recently he has served as a high-level EU expert to the State Committee for Science of the Polish Government (KBN) and to the Russian government in Moscow.

At present he is *inter alia* President of the Committee for the Promotion of the French-German-Polish Co-operation ('*Weimar Triangle*'), Berlin/Cabourg and Chairman, International Advisory Committee, Foundation Technology Partners Consortium, Warsaw; he is furthermore the Managing Member of the Board of the *Odergemeinschaft e.V.*, a non-governmental initiative aiming to create the "Oder Community for Science, Technology and Industry" linking through permanent networks the East German *Länder* bordering the rivers Oder and Neisse with the *Wojewodships* of Western Poland.

He is a Member of the President's Council, New York Academy of Sciences, New York; elected Member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Vienna; Special Advisor for Eastern Europe to the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, London and a Governor, Kulturstiftung Haus Europa, Berlin; Governor, Opportunity International Deutschland, Schorndorf, he is member of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* et al. He was awarded with the Federal Cross of Merit of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, (1st Class).

His research is focussing on various topics concerning issues of international co-operation (including EU enlargement and transatlantic co-operation, North-South relations), R&D Management, Science and Technology Policy, International competitiveness, International Organisations).

He is author and/or editor of more than a dozen monographs and has authored more than 160 articles on his fields of interest.

He has been, respectively continues to be, permanent honorary member of the Faculties of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), Jouay-en-Jossas/Paris; the Free University, Berlin; the University of Potsdam and of the Poznan University of Economics.

Furthermore, he has assumed numerous Lecturing Assignments at universities in Eastern and Western Europe, in North and Latin America as well as in Asia.